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Abstract
This paper proposes a mechanism for structuring international institutions to e¢ ciently provision
global security against the threat of a rogue nation. The e¤ects of security e¤ort by an alliance member are
assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable for other members. Specically, this e¤ort has both positive
and negative e¤ects, as security measures prevent attacks by the rogue nation, but also involves loss of
commercial and diplomatic benets. Further, the alliance members are assumed to have heterogeneous
tastes regarding the desired security level. The allies act strategically vis-a-vis one another with regard
to security provision, and the alliance a whole acts strategically with respect to the rogue nation, which
strategizes in turn. Importantly, this paper investigates how the evolution of public opinion, in the
respective countries facing the rogue nations threat, impacts the proposed mechanism.
JEL Classication Numbers: D74, H41, H56.
Keywords: Alliances, International Institutions, Conict, Security.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview and main results
This paper tackles the issue of designing an institutional structure for a military alliance facing the common
threat of a rogue nation. The goal is to design an alliance structure which would ensure an e¢ cient level of
joint security for the members of the alliance as a whole, in the situation where the alliance members have
heterogeneous tastes regarding the desired security level. The threat faced by the alliance is endogenized in
my model: there is a rogue nation which acts strategically vis-à-vis the alliance, hence making the threat level
variable in response to action by the alliance. Interestingly, strategic behavior by the rogue nation makes it
possible to analyze how evolving tastes for security among the member nations of the alliance would impact
the provision of international security.
In this paper, the security e¤ort by an alliance member is assumed to be non-rival and non-excludable,
so the benets of the e¤ort jointly accrue to every other member. This e¤ort has both positive and negative
e¤ects, as security measures prevent attacks by the rogue nation, but also involves loss of commercial,
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political, and diplomatic benets. Thus, it is assumed that security e¤ort may not only have positive
externalities, but also have negative externalities beyond a point. Note that the type of negative externality
considered in this paper does not arise either due to the fact that action by one of the allies deects the threat
to another ally, nor is it due to the fact that the allied actions bring about a stronger adversarial response
(though the latter possibility is present in my model). This distinction is important, as it separates my paper
from other models studying the role of negative externalities in the context of defense alliances.1 Specically,
alliance models of defense dealing with negative externalities may be divided into two categories:
(i). Models of defense alliances against enemy nations in which the negative externality arises because greater
arming by an ally leads to a more severe reaction by the adversary, leading to a negative externality for other
allies.2
(ii). Models of alliances against terrorism, where more e¤ort by an ally deects terrorists to target another
ally, thereby leading to negative externality of e¤ort.3
However, my model considers another scenario that has become the issue of much national and international
debate, particularly after the Second Gulf War which does not t either of the above contexts. I deal with
the negative externality accruing to allies (like France and Germany, for example) due to unilateral actions
by another ally (the US, a NATO ally) against an adversary (Saddam Hussein-era Iraq). We may call this
a third kind" of negative externality in an alliance situation, quite distinct from those I describe in points
(i) and (ii) above. In my opinion, it is fairly clear that it would not be proper to characterize this third kind
of negative externality as being the same as negative externalities in points (i) and (ii). This third kind of
negative externality has received much attention in the media and public sphere over the last decade, but to
the best of my knowledge, not been addressed su¢ ciently in the economics literature.4
Using my model, I characterize the equilibrium of a benchmark non-cooperative game of joint e¤ort provision
among the nations, in case of an endogenously determined level of threat. In this equilibrium a single nation
unilaterally provisions e¤ort for the whole alliance. For specied conditions, this level of e¤ort may be
either greater or lesser than the e¢ cient level. As one of the major contributions of this paper, I suggest
1See Sandler and Hartley (1995) for a survey of models in that category.
2A notable example of such a model may be found in Bruce (1990). Sandler and Hartley (2001) also mention this issue (see
page 888).
3Numerous contributions in this area exist in the literature. For the interested reader wishing to acquaint oneself in this
genre, notable and recent papers include those by Sandler (2005) and Sandler and Siqueira (2006). In the words of Sandler
(2005), defensive actions deect attacks to softer targets, thereby giving rise to external benets to protected foreign residents,
and external costs to venues abroad".
4Critics might respond that the Second Gulf War did not involve unilateral action by the US, and it was a multilateral
action. However, there is enough opinion to the contrary in public discourse. Many experts, at least in Europe, see the US
action as predominantly unilateral, where token participation of some minor nations was secured through political channels for
the purpose of legitimacy. Further, British participation along with the US, might have occurred as a result of the traditional
closeness of Anglo-US foreign policy during the major part of the twentieth century (and, as some observers might allege, the
lack of a truly independent British policy). In my model below, British participation can easily be technically incorporated by
assuming the same preference parameter for security for both nations (which would lead to multiple equilibria, some of which
would be consistent with the observed Anglo-US participation). I steer clear of this assumption to keep my model clean, since
doing so would not qualitatively a¤ect my main results.
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an institutional structure for the alliance which would lead to the achievement of the e¢ cient level of
world security through multilateral contribution. This structure requires that voting on the issue of security
provision for the alliance be restricted to a subset of member nations, as well as the requirement of unanimity
among these nations to adopt a resolution.
Another, perhaps more important, contribution of the paper is to characterize the dependency of the
e¢ ciency mechanism on the evolution of the taste for security, within respective members nations of the
alliance (due to changing national public opinion). Results show that the workability of the mechanism is
dependent on whether the public in the ally nations harden or soften their proclivity for proactive action5
against the rogue nation, upon the escalation of conict. Notably, it is seen that often the divergence of
public opinion among the respective nations (for example, public opinion in nation A hardening in favor
of action against the rogue nation, while that in nation B moving against action) actually helps in the
multilateral provision of global security in certain cases, while it hampers such e¤orts in other situations.
Various combinations of evolving public opinion in the respective member nations of the alliance, and the
implications for the maintenance of the alliance against the rogue nation, are examined.
A brief summary of the main results, along with related intuition, may be helpful to the reader at this
juncture:
(i). An institutional mechanism is suggested to move the joint e¤ort level of the alliance from a unilateral
(ine¢ cient) to an e¢ cient (multilateral) level. The details of the mechanism are left for the main body of
the paper. In short, the mechanism involves the delegation of power to a neutral directorateto suggest a
scheme (deal) involving transfers and e¤ort levels between alliance members, whose adoption is voted on by
a subset of member nations under unanimity rule. Some deal-breakersare left out of the voting process.
(ii). It is seen that the transfer scheme is likely to work when the support for the movement towards e¢ ciency
(through payments) arises from the desires of the payers regarding security e¤ort (captured through a public
opinionparameter) either "getting close" or "remaining close" to the desire of the nation that would act
unilaterally under status quo. Thus, in some sense, for the mechanism to work, a partial meeting of minds
between alliance members must occur. This nding is important, as it arises only when the security-related
desires of the payers evolve, rather than stay xed. This evolution of security-related desires is brought about
in my model through the endogenization of the security threat. Intuitively, when security-related desires of
the nations are xed, distance between opinionswould provide the incentive for the proposed mechanism
to work (see Gupta (2010)). In face of evolving threat, as seen in the current paper, we realize that there
is another possible path for the mechanism to work, i.e. through a path of convergence of opinions, that
5Where the ght is taken to the enemy through various means, rather than being purely defensive in nature, in order to
protect ones assets against harm from the actions of the enemy, or mitigate their e¤ects.
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would cause a fall in the level of transfers needed to move to e¢ ciency.
(iii). When the changes in security-related desires of alliance members move in opposite directions, rather
than in the same direction, due to a change in threat levels, there are implications for the workability of
the mechanism. An e¢ cient level which is higher than the unilateral level might be easier to sustain, in the
situation where opposite movement occurs, compared to the situation where the desires move in the same
direction. This happens because payer nations become more willing to pay up in the former case. On the
other hand, an e¢ cient level which is lower than the unilateral level might be harder or easier to sustain,
depending on certain specic conditions regarding desired amounts of payment-transfers, of both payers and
recipients. This result demonstrates the impact of fair-weather friends" within the alliance, i.e. allies that
increase support for joint security e¤ort when the threat becomes less dangerous, but withdraw support in
more dangerous circumstances.
1.2 Related literature
The contribution of this paper to the alliance literature should be seen in the current context in which the
tastes of traditional allies on security issues have diverged to a considerable extent.6 In fact, there seems to be
disagreement among allies on certain issues (like the US, France, and Germany in the context of the Second
Gulf War) whether after a certain level security e¤ort is intrinsically goodor bad, in sharp contrast to
the Cold War era. The institutional structure suggested by the paper takes into consideration these changes
in world a¤airs. In the process we add to the literature on the economics of alliances beginning with Olson
and Zeckhausers seminal contributions (1966 and 1967), which studied the NATO defense alliance against
the USSR, and analyzed the dominant role of the United States in it. Later contributions by Murdoch
and Sandler (1982) and McGuire (1990) studied the evolving structure of NATO, with countries other
than the US taking on a greater share of the defense burden than before, and the various explanations
of this occurrence (like the joint product" model, and public-private benets of defense, among others).
Chowdhury (2007) extends this line of research to alliances between nations asymmetric in wealth (GNP)
and population. Chowdhury shows that asymmetry between alliance partners has implications for the
level of defense provision and the departure from e¢ ciency, depending on the nature of the equilibrium
(interior versus corner solution).7 Other important contributions include Niou and Tans (2005) analysis
of Olsons (1965) propositions of suboptimality and exploitation in the context of collective action, in face
of endogenized external threat. Interestingly, Bruce (1990) shows that cooperative arrangement within an
alliance to provision more defense spending (above the noncooperative level) may worsen the welfare of
6For a detailed survey see Hartley and Sandler (1995) and Sandler and Hartley (1995). Additionally, see related literature
on the role of alliances in combating terrorism, which include contributions by Lee (1988), Lee and Sandler (1989), Sandler and
Lapan (1988), and Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983).
7For alternative collective-goods models of military alliances, see Conybeare, Murdoch, and Sandler (1994).
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all concerned parties. This happens due to increased expenditures on part of both the alliance and the
adversary. In a related article, Ihori (2000) shows that in large adversarial alliances, nations in one of the
alliances might be better o¤ by cooperating, compared to the noncooperative outcome. This happens even
with a large negative spillover from the adversarial bloc. Ihori also extends this result to a leader-follower
game within the alliance.
Specically, this current paper builds on Gupta (2010), which proposes a similar mechanism for e¢ ciently
provisioning global security by an alliance. However, in that paper, the threat against the alliance is as-
sumed to be exogenous. Endogenizing the threat actually has considerable implications for the institutional
mechanism - particularly the role of evolving public opinion on its e¤ectiveness. The importance of this
institutional mechanism may also be understood in a broader context, when we realize that if institutional
mechanisms promoting commitment on part of the members are absent, promises within the alliance might
often be broken. In a broader context, how do the results of my model t within the literature on institu-
tional mechanisms for burden-sharing of common defense?8 In order to see this, I will now compare and
contrast my analysis with a few of the interesting and important contributions in the defense literature, on
institutional mechanisms. Weber and Wiesmeths (1991) analysis of a supranational institutional structure
for NATO, that leads to quasi-egalitarian cost-sharing among the members, is of special interest in this
regard.9 The solution proposed by the authors is supportable as a strong Nash, depending on the require-
ment of a planning agency with supranational inuence and power to enforce their mechanism. In a more
recent paper, Arce and Sandler (2001a) consider the use of correlated strategies among allies to send costless
signals, which allow the participants to avoid bad outcomes and improve their expected payo¤s over Nash
equilibria. In Arce and Sandler (2001b), the authors use cooperative game theory to model alliances with
noncontiguous members. There are cost savings from reducing overlapping responsibilities and sequestering
borders. This approach leads to a distribution of alliance costs that does not coincide with the exploitation
hypothesis - rather it depends on a nations spatial and strategic location within the alliance. Comparing
my model and results with the above, two facts stand out: (a). The real-world situation I am trying to
model (a way around unilateralism of the type seen during the Second Gulf War), is di¤erent than those
8For discussions of institutional arrangements within a nation for the allocation of defense budgets, see Murdoch, Sandler,
and Hansen (1991). Jones (1992) recognizes the importance of the proper structuring of supranational structures (in his case,
to reduce the excesses that arise from bureaucratic ine¢ ciency at the national level). From an empirical perspective, McGuire
and Groth (1985) develop a model to test, using data on an alliances collective expenditure, whether the resource allocation
process within the alliance is cooperative or competitive, or a mixture of both.
9There are also numerous interesting contributions in the bargaining literature, not specically related to defense burden-
sharing. For example, Manzini and Mariotti (2005) show how di¤erent preference aggregation procedures within alliances in
political parties, trade unions, etc., a¤ect the bargaining outcome - they nd that unanimity procedures lead to more aggressive
negotiating tactics than majority procedures. In another contribution that is relevant in the context of distributional conict
inside a group, Konrad and Leininger (2011) show that leadership by a big man" yields e¢ cient coordination of collective action
in a conict with an external competitor. Moulin (1995) discusses cooperative solutions to collective action and cost-sharing
problems. There is also considerable literature in environmental economics analyzing institutional arrangements for pollution
abatement. Important contributions in this area include Chander and Tulkens (1992, 1994, 1997) and Barrett (1994, 2001).
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being modeled by the above contributions; and (b). The mechanism I outline in my paper is su¢ ciently
di¤erent than the solutions derived in those papers. Thus, my paper adds in a novel fashion to the litera-
ture on institutional mechanisms, in the context of defense alliances. The optimistic message is that it is
possible for allies with divergent views regarding security to reach a compromise, and e¤ectively provision
an e¢ cient level of joint security. Particularly, rather than the nay-sayers withdrawing from engagement,
their participation is required to move the alliance to e¢ ciency. This nding stands in stark contrast to the
policy adopted by France and Germany vis-a-vis the United States during the Second Gulf War - a stance
which did not prevent unilateral action in Iraq.
In addition to the above research, it is also possible to place my paper in the context of rational design
of international institutions, which has been studied in the eld of international relations. A collection of
inuential work may be found in the special issue of International Relations (Vol. 55, No. 4, 2001), which
is devoted to this topic. In two papers Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001a,b) introduce the theoretical
underpinnings of the rational design project" and then summarize the empirical ndings of the project.
Wendt (2001) addresses some of the gaps of the rational design project - of particular interest is his view that
making institutions is about the future and has an intrinsic normative element, so there is a need of knowledge
about what values to pursue in designing institutions. Mitchell and Keilbachs (2001) contribution, which
shows that in the presence of negative externalities, exchange institutions relying on the positive linkage of
rewards are more likely to succeed when victims are weaker than the perpetrators, certainly rings a bell in
the context of my paper.
Section 2, below, formalizes a model of global security provision. Section 3 develops the institutional structure
that would lead to the e¢ cient provision of security. Section 4 analyzes the robustness of the proposed
institution by relaxing an assumption seen in previous sections. Section 5 discusses the broad implications
and context of the results obtained in the paper. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
The Allies
There is a nite number of countries (governments) i = 1; 2; ::::::; I forming an alliance, to ght against a
level of global threat t 2 [0;1).
The utility of government i is given by:
6
U i(mi; e; t) = Utility of private good + Positive benets of joint e¤ort + Negative benets of joint e¤ort
= mi + Si(e; t) N i(e)
= mi + i(t)S(e) $iN(e)
= mi + i(t)e $ie2
Here mi is a private good (money) consumed by i, e =
PI
i=1 e
i is the amount of joint e¤ort expended by
the alliance against the rogue nation, ei is is (non-negative) contribution to the joint e¤ort.10 E¤ort is
assumed to be proactive (o¤ensive rather than defensive), non-rival, and non-excludable - its results jointly
accrue to every member. Note that this e¤ort might include military action, trade embargoes, and other
kinds of punitive action. Let i(t) 2 (0;1) be di¤erent for each nation (I explain below what  is), or
i(:) 6= j(:);8i; j: For the present I assume that  is increasing in the level of threat t, hence it > 0 (this
assumption will be modied in later sections, to explore certain other plausible situations that might occur).
The value of (:) is greatest for country I for any t, so I(:) > i(:);8i 6= I. The other (I   1) alliance
members are ranked according to the value of their s, such that for all t, I 1(:) > I 2(:) > :::: > 1(:):
i may be thought of as an index of public support for security e¤ort in a nation.11 The marginal benet
of e¤ort for i is [i(t)   2e], which implies @2Ui@e@t > 0: Thus, the marginal benet is more for higher i(t):
Briey, the governmentsutility is dependent on the amount of private good consumed and the security e¤ort
expended by the alliance. However, such e¤ort does not only have the positive e¤ect of increasing security
S(e) = e by eliminating the threat,12 but also has a negative e¤ect N(e) on utility in case the e¤ort put in by
the alliance infringes on commercial benets, diplomatic and trade contacts, political ties, etc. Both these
elements are captured in the governments utility function by the term Si(e; t)   N i(e) = [i(t)e   $ie2],
where Si(e; t) = i(t)S(:) = i(t)e and N i(e) = $iN(e) = $ie2, where $i is a positive index of nation i0s
share of disutility of joint e¤ort. In what follows, I assume $i= 1 for all nations, for the sake of simplicity.
Thus, N i(e) = e2.13 The reader might wonder why joint, rather than just individual activity activity has
negative consequences for a nation. It is likely that joint e¤ort would have disutility for an individual alliance
10The linear technology for summing e¤ort is widely used in the conict literature. There are other kind of technologies
that have been used in various contexts like the weakest-link" and best-shot" technologies, but I restrict myself to the linear
technology - which seems adequate for the purpose of this paper.
11 I ignore the social choice aspect of aggregating mass preferences here. I assume this index represents the aggregate
preferences of all involved national constituents.
12 I assume there is a simple linear technology converting e¤ort to a level of security (by destroying the threat). The process
how e¤ort eliminates the threat is not modeled.
13The results of my model will not change qualitatively even if $I < $I 1 < ::: < $i < ::: < $1. This particular scenario
seems quite plausible as nation I (being the one most opposed to the rogue nation, would be expected to have the least
commercial and diplomatic benets from it, compared to nations that were less intrinsically inimical to it. Thus the latter
would su¤er relatively more negative e¤ects in case of conict. For example the commercial benets of France and Germany in
case of Saddam Hussein-era Iraq were more than the US. As mentioned, given that this assumption were true, the qualitative
results of my model would not change if the assumption of $i = 1,for all i, were to be made instead, with the added benet to
algebraic simplicity in the latter case.
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member, though the e¤ort might be made by another alliance member. Joint action (in the nature of direct
military action or trade embargoes, etc.) may a¤ect regional stability and political conditions, which might
a¤ect commercial ties and other relations with the rogue nation. In a real life context, the commercial ties
of France and Germany with Saddam Husseins Iraq certainly got a¤ected by the Second Gulf War. In sum,
for a given level of t, an increase in joint e¤ort e leads to greater utility by providing security, but also has
a disutility that is captured by the part e2: Thus, we have single-peaked utility function for these nations,
with di¤erent ideal points" of security for each of them.14
Cost structure of the alliance members: The budget constraint of each ally is mi + C(ei)  M i;where
1 > M i > 0 is the initial endowment of the private good of i and C(ei) = cei; c > 0; is the cost of security
level ei.
The Rogue Nation
There is a rogue nation L which makes the decision to make e¤ort t 2 [0;1), which gives the level of threat
against the alliance of countries seen above.15
The utility of the rogue nation is given by:
UL(mL; t; e) = Utility of private good + Positive benets of threat e¤ort + Negative benets of threat e¤ort
= mL + (e)t  t2
where mL 2 [0;1) is a private good (money) consumed by L, and 0 < (e) < 1 is a preference index of
the rogue government, and is a measure of the support it has for it activities from within its constituency.
Let e < 0:
The rogue government has a positive benet from undertaking e¤ort, as well as disutility from that e¤ort.
The positive benet would come from causing harm to what they consider enemy nations. Note that this
benet is weighted by the term (e):This is because a rogue state may su¤er plausible consequences from
the security e¤ort of the allies, which would decrease the value" of its positive benet (various e¤ects of
trade embargoes, boycotts and restrictions, and even direct military action b the allies. This is reected
by the fact that e < 0; which leads to the utility of the rogues e¤ort being less, for more e. The last
14As an aside, some readers might like the level of e¤ort itself, made by a nation, to have some e¤ect on public support for
the government - as the public might have to ultimately pay for e¤ort, perhaps by way of higher taxes. I make the simplifying
assumption that even if such an e¤ect is present, it is purely decomposable from the support for security e¤ort that arises from
the publics perception of threat. If that is the case, then if for the sake of simplicity if I assume that some part of public
support for the government su¤ers from an increase in e¤ort in a linear fashion, then it can be made part of e¤ort costs, and
will not a¤ect the results of this paper qualitatively. In other words, if the e¤ort based support for the government su¤ers for
increasing e¤ort, then a cost function written as (e) = e can be subsumed into the overall cost structure of e¤ort provision in
this model. Hence, in what follows I choose to ignore this detail.
15 I could also have modeled a linear technology that would have mapped e¤ort by the rogue nation one-to-one onto a level
of threat. However, I choose to neglect this technical detail and interchangeably use the concepts of e¤ort by the rogue nation
and the level of threat presented by it. This shortcut does not a¤ect the results of my model.
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term t2 captures the disutility of committing bad acts" faced by the rogue nation, as it su¤ers more and
more isolation from its supporters in the rest of the world (as it raises its threat e¤ort) - I assume that this
last e¤ect occurs due to the behavior of countries which are outside supporters of the rogue nation (who,
however, are not rogues themselves), and not belonging to the alliance ghting it.16 The marginal utility of
the rogues e¤ort (activity) decreases with an increase in the given level of e, i.e. @
2UL
@t@e < 0:
Cost structure of the rogue nation: The budget constraint of the rogue country is given by: mL + C(t) 
ML;where 1 > ML > 0 is the initial endowment of the private good of L and C(t) = vt; v > 0; is the cost
of threat activity level t:
2.2 The benchmark game
I consider that all countries play a simultaneous move game of complete and perfect information with respect
to its alliance members and with the rogue enemy nation. The rogue nation also moves simultaneously with
respect to the actions taken by the alliance members, and has complete information. In the overall game there
are (I + 1) players, with the alliance members choosing e¤ort ei, and the rogue nation choosing threat level
(e¤ort) tL. To repeat, all countries, including the alliance members, and the rogue nation, act simultaneously
with respect to each other.
Payo¤s: The payo¤ for an alliance member is V i and that of the rogue nation isV L, such that V i(:) =
M i +
PI
i=1 e
i[i(t) PIi=1 ei]  cei, for i = 1; 2; ::; I; and V L(:) =ML + (e)t  (t)2   vt, for L: Note that
e =
PI
i=1 e
i: The reader will notice that these payo¤s incorporate the cost side of the nationsdecisions
(using their budget constraint equations).
Equilibrium
We can solve for the Nash equilibrium of the overall game by solving for the Nash equilibrium level of e¤ort
of each country in a game within its alliance, taking the e¤ort level of the enemy as given. This will give us
the joint e¤ort level of the alliance, as well as the choice of threat by the rogue nation, as a reaction function
of the other. Using these reaction functions, we can arrive at the equilibrium level of threat and security
e¤ort.
As a rst step, note that ally is e¤ort in the game between the governments in the alliance, given the rogues
threat level, is given by:17
16Nations like Saddam-Hussein era Iraq, North Korea, and Iran have had their supporters in the global community. However,
this support would likely su¤er as these countries raise their threat e¤orts, as it becomes harder and harder for these outside"
nations to support an undeniable rogue nation.
17 In my model I assume that at times of crises the time available for responses is so small that e¤ort provision must practically
be simultaneous.
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ei =
1
2
[i(t)  c  2P
j
ej ]; for i > c+ 2
P
ej ; j 6= i
and 0; otherwise (since ei  0)
Examination of the above FOC reveals that it must be that ei = 0 for i 6= I . This can be seen by plugging
in the value of a positive eI in the above equation and realizing that this would fetch a negative value of ei
(which violates the condition ei  0), for all values of t. But for ei = 0 for i 6= I, eI = 12 [I(t)  c]. Thus, in
the Nash equilibrium of the intra-bloc game for the alliance, e¤ort is provided solely by country I (all other
allies provide zero e¤ort levels) and is given by:
eN = eI =
1
2
[I(t)  c]
See Appendix 1 for a formal derivation of the equilibrium of the intra-alliance game, and the uniqueness of
the equilibrium.
Now, in order to get the equilibrium of the overall game (involving the alliance and the rogue nation), we
solve for the FOC of the rogue nation. The equilibrium level of threat is given by:
tL =
1
2
[(e)  v]
Now, we must solve for the equilibrium of the game between the alliance as a whole and the rogue nation: this
e¤ectively reduces to a game between the two countries I and L, given the equilibrium of the intra-alliance
game above (note that all players, including the rogue nation, move simultaneously). The players I and L
have e¤ort choices eI and tL; and payo¤ functions V I and V L. Here V I(:) =M I + eI [I(tL)  eI ]  ceI and
V L(:) = ML + tL[(eI)  tL]  vtL and eI = eN and tL = tN : So, the Nash equilibrium e¤ort outcome for
this overall game is described by the pair (eN ; tN ) given by the simultaneous solution of the equations:
eN =
1
2
[I(tL)  c]
and
tN =
1
2
[(eI)  v]
for tN = tL and e = eN = eI : Let us call eN the unilateral e¤ort level for the alliance. I compile the above
results in Proposition 1 below.
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Proposition 1 The inter-alliance e¤ort choice game leads to a unilateral outcome, with the nation having
the highest public support for security provision making all of the joint e¤ort for the alliance. Thus in Nash
equilibrium, nation I; with I(:) > i(:)8i 6= I, provisions joint e¤ort level for the alliance eN = 12 [I(tL) c],
and the rogue nation makes threat level tN = 12 [(e
I)  v].
Remark 1 The slope of the reaction function of the alliance is @e
N
@tN
> 0; and that of the rogue nation is
@tN
@eN
< 0:
Proposition 1 is unremarkable in itself, and as such is an extreme artifact that allows us to concentrate
in developing the more substantial parts of the paper, in the following sections. The case of extreme
unilateralism" seen in the proposition arises due to fact that for every ally: (a). The e¤ort technology is
linear; (b). There are no income e¤ects because of the quasi-linear utility functions; (c). The cost functions
are linear; (d). The wealth endowment of country I does not impose a binding constraint on its e¤ort
level, below its private optimal; and (e). The taste of e¤ort of country I is distinctly more than all other
allies (if another country shared the same taste, multiple equilibria would be possible). If Proposition
1 was the main result of the paper, there would not be much insight gained from it, particularly in a
real-world context. Further, more general environments, in themselves, have already been studied in the
economics of alliances literature and do not remain topics of new research (see Sandler and Hartley (2001)
for a comprehensive survey of such studies). However, since the main purpose of the paper is to build an
institution to gain e¢ ciency, in the face of unilateralism, I would argue that the strong special-case artifact
of strong unilateralism is therefore a desirable benchmark. Further, the insights gained in this environment
(seen in Propositions 2 and 3 which follow in subsequent sections) will remain relevant in more general
contexts. More general contexts might include:
(i). Non-linear e¤ort technology, income e¤ects in the utility function, binding wealth constraints, non-linear
costs, same taste parameters for security e¤ort: Any, or a combination of these factors, might lead to extreme
unilateralism not occurring. However, I will later argue (in Section 5) that the insights of the main results
of this paper (Propositions 2 and 3) will be mostly valid in a more general setting.
(ii). Presence of uncertainty: In this paper I assume complete and perfect information. Countries with a
working intelligence apparatus would know with a level of certainty the public support" for security in free
nations, and the proclivity for creating disruption (in the case of the rogue nation) in most circumstances.
For example, there is no reason France and Germany would not know the US publics support for war, to
the extent the US government would (hence there might be little scope for the US to masquerade"). This
might be a little harder in case of the rogue nation, particularly if the leadership in that nation is unstable".
For the purposes of this paper I rely on the strength of the intelligence gathering apparatus in identifying
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this information, which might be true in many real-world situations. However, I recognize that the main
results of this paper may need to be modied in a highly uncertain environment - an issue which should be
explored in subsequent research. On the side of the alliance members, regime change might be an issue -
the preferences of the Bush and Obama administrations in the US regarding security were not the same. So
players acting in a situation of pending regime change might have incomplete information at the time they
have to act. This issue is also left for future research.
2.3 E¢ ciency
I now solve for the e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort of the alliance:
MaximizefPmi;eg IP
i=1
V i(:) =
P
i
mi +
P
i
e[i(t)  e];
s:t:
P
i
mi + ce =
P
i
M i;
X
mi 2 [0;1); e 2 [0;1)
or
Maximizefeg
P
M i + e[
P
i(t)  Ie]  ce; e 2 [0;1)
Solution to the FOC of the above problem gives us the e¢ cient solution:
eE =
1
2I
[
IP
i=1
i(t)  c]
If the alliance provisions the e¢ cient level of e¤ort eE and not the unilateral level eN , the rogue country L
will make e¤ort
(A)
tE =
1
2
[(eE)  v]
We notice that this level of e¤ort is di¤erent than that seen in the last section, since it is a best-response to
the e¢ cient e¤ort level by the alliance, and not the unilateral level eN . Let us call this tE . To reiterate, this
is the best response" threat level from the rogue nation to e¢ cient" joint e¤ort by the alliance.
Thus, putting t = tE in the equation for eE we get:
(B)
eE =
1
2I
[
IP
i=1
i(tE)  c]
The equilibrium at the inter-bloc level is given by the pair (eE ; tE) got by simultaneous solution of equations
(A) and (B). The e¢ cient level of e¤ort for the alliance may be more or less than the unilateral level, as seen
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in lemma 2 below. The e¢ cient e¤ort level is unique, and not dependent on who provides the e¤ort. It may
be provided by any combination of nations (and I suggest a scheme on who will provide it, in the section
below).
Lemma 1 The e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort eE is lesser (greater) than the unilateral outcome eN for I(tN ) RPI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I :
Proof. eE S eN for 12I [
P
i 
i(tE)  c] S 12 [I(tN )  c]:
Rearranging the terms of the latter inequality, we arrive at the above result.
We notice that the index  shifts for a change in e¤ort level, since the level of threat is sensitive to the e¤ort
level of the alliances. Thus, whether the e¢ cient e¤ort level is more or less than the unilateral level depends
not just on the values of the s in the unilateral outcome, but the values of the s that would occur if the
alliance were to shift to the e¢ cient level of security from the unilateral level. In other words, the e¢ ciency
level is dependent on the magnitudes of shift of these indices, for a change in the level of threat that would
occur from a shift in the security level. Note that the e¢ cient level can be higher than the unilateral level,
even though the s might all have fallen, because the former is a function of the sum of the s, and hence
this situation is possible (especially if the unilateral level was low to begin with).
Assumption: I assume that nation I still has the highest , if the alliance moves from the unilateral to the
e¢ cient e¤ort level:
The next result relates the level of threat observed in our model, to the level of security that is provisioned
by the alliance. It seems fairly intuitive that if the level of e¤ort at the e¢ cient outcome is less than the
unilateral outcome for the alliance, then the equilibrium amount of threat in the former situation will be
more compared to the latter. The opposite should hold for the situation where the level of e¢ cient security
e¤ort is more than the unilateral level. Conversely, if the level of threat is higher for the alliance making
the unilateral e¤ort level, compared to the level of threat if they play the e¢ cient outcome, then it must be
true that the e¤ort in the unilateral outcome is lower than that in the e¢ cient outcome. These results are
proved below.
Lemma 2 If security e¤ort at the unilateral outcome is greater (lesser) than that at the e¢ cient outcome,
then the threat level is lesser (greater) at those respective outcomes, and vice versa, i.e. eN ? eE () tN 7
tE :
Proof. See Appendix 2.
We note that since tE > tN implies eE < eN ; it must be true for tE > tN that the condition I(tN ) >PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I must hold (using the above result and Lemma 1). In other words, if ex-post e¢ ciency
requires a drop in security levels, then the average of the public opinion indices (even after the increase in the
threat level), must be still lesser than the public opinion index in country I under the unilateral outcome.
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3 The institutional structure
I will now outline an institutional structure for the alliance which will lead to the provision of an e¢ cient
level of joint security.18 This institutional structure is set forth through the game described below, which
I will henceforth call the institutional game". For the sake of brevity, I describe the game for the case
where eE < eN - a game with an absolutely similar structure is applicable for the case eE > eN , with minor
changes in some of the technical conditions seen below (for the sake of completeness, I actually work out the
conditions applicable to the eE > eN case in Section 3.1).
Let the set of all the I members of the alliance be called S. The transfers will be paid by a set of payers
P  S to a set of recipients R  S. In what follows, I will outline a game of complete information in
which all the members belonging to the sets P and R participate, along with a neutral player (think of
the neutral player as an independent entity within a supranational agency, like the O¢ ce of Security within
the NATO - perhaps more appropriately an independent career-based bureaucracy). There will be certain
rules of interaction among the players. From these rules it is possible to identify an institutional structure
for the alliance that would lead to the e¢ cient outcome. I call the game described below the institutional
game. All players in this game are rational and have complete information. This game exists only if P is
non-empty: It is assumed that the ex-post e¢ ciency condition outlined in the paper holds. The "institutional
game" is as follows:
There are four stages in this game. In the rst stage, the neutral player makes a proposal to the other
players. The proposal is a collection of elements [P;R; (T i)Ii=1; (e
i)Ii=1], where P is a set of payers, R is
a set of recipients, (T i)Ii=1 is a vector of transfers paid by payers and received by recipients, and (e
i)Ii=1
is a particular e¤ort vector. For what follows, let the e¤ort vector proposed by the neutral player be
(ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E): P and R are such that P [R = S; and P \R is an empty set.
In the second stage, the players in the set P , player I, and players i 2 R with i > 0 simultaneously vote
either Agree or Not Agree to the proposal. The parameter i (where i = i(tE)  eN
eE
i(tN )) depends on the
evolution of public support" for security e¤ort in nation i, and is described in detail in Section 3.1 below.
As mentioned, for the payers the proposal contains a total amount that they need to pay and a rule to divide
the payment among them. For I; the proposal commits to pay an amount of transfer  to him, dependent
18Some readers might wonder whether my results run contrary to Warrs (1983) famous neutrality result. Warr states that
under appropriate conditions lump-sum transfers of income from one person to another will cause no change in the amount of the
public good provided. However, I would recall to the reader that the neutrality theorem generally does not carry over to more
complicated bargaining models. In Warrs model, even though the government makes income transfers, the agents then play a
simple public goods provision game afterwards - more provision by some agents lead to less provision by others in equilibrium.
In contrast, in my mechanism, not only are transfers made between agents, but constraints upon the playersprovisions exist
by contract, as a condition of these transfers. Further, Cornes and Sandler (2000) show that when redistributions are made
from non-contributors to contributors (which also happens in my model), such transfers can lead to a new Nash equilibrium,
that Pareto-dominates the one without redistributions.
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on it making the e¢ cient e¤ort level. For the proposal to be adopted, it must be adopted unanimously
by all players in the set P and player I. Otherwise the proposal fails, and no transfers are made. Once a
player votes for the proposal, it is committed to adhering to it. It is not possible (by membership rules of
the alliance) for any member of P to make a private transfer to any other player, other than through the
neutral player. If the proposal succeeds, the neutral player takes the amounts given in vector (T i)Ii=1 and
holds them. If it does not, no payments are made, that is (T i)Ii=1 = (0
i)Ii=1:
In the third stage, the alliance members i 2 RnI with i < 0 play a simultaneous-move non-cooperative
game of e¤ort choice for adoption of the proposal.19 For non-adoption of the proposal , there is the status
quo e¤ort choice game with all players in S. If the proposal was adopted in the second stage, there is an
e¤ort choice game where transfer amounts are committed by the neutral player to recipients according to a
scheme outlined in the proposal (which is discussed in detail later). In brief, the neutral player commits to
pay players i 2 R a transfer sum zi from the transfer amounts handed over to it by the payers, if the e¤ort
chosen by them is zero. If, however, they make positive e¤ort then they do not receive this transfer. For
the proposal being adopted and the set (RnI and i < 0) being empty, there is no third stage, the fourth
stage described below follows the second. In this paper I assume the more general case, so the set (RnI and
i < 0) is assumed to be non-empty:
The fourth stage is the payments stage (for the game with transfers). Payments are made to all recipients
upon observation of e¤ort or money given back to payers, in full or in part (dependent on the e¤ort choices
of the players in set R).
Lastly, it is assumed that the neutral player does not retain any money itself (thus, the amount paid by the
payers equals the amount received by the recipients) and conforms to all the rules of the game described
above.20
3.1 Payers
The rst step now is to nd out in our model which of the alliance partners would be willing to pay to move
from an allocation with e¤ort vector with joint e¤ort provision at eN , to one at which the joint e¤ort is eE , and
how much. For a country to be willing to pay a positive amount zi for this movement, it has to be true that
its utility from eE must be greater than from eN , even after it pays zi: For the unilateral outcome, no country
19Note that in my scheme these countries would be the recipients of transfers, but are not included among the players having
votes in the second stage. This is because they are not compensated enough to give them their status-quo utility and would
break any deal that moves to e¢ ciency from status quo, if they could. These nations are the ultimate beneciaries of free-riding
and lose their exaggerated benets in the proposed scheme.
20 I also ignore any transaction costs that might arise in the implementation of this mechanism. The simple reason for that is
that such costs will have to be absorbed by the payees (and reimbursed to the recipients) as part of the transfer payments. This
would a¤ect the size of the payments, but have no other e¤ect on the mechanism I describe. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, I
have chosen to ignore transaction costs. Of course, presence of insurmountable transaction costs would derail the whole exercise
and make it pointless - a possibility that I assume does not arise.
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pays anything. In our current environment, the change in the threat level in response to the alliances action,
becomes important. The individual rationality condition for i being willing to pay zi > 0 to achieve the
e¢ cient e¤ort outcome over the unilateral outcome is [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]:
The notation is as seen in earlier sections, and the superscripts for the security e¤ort, threat levels and the
private goods are self explanatory. We now nd out that for a certain country willing to pay for the change,
what is the maximum amount that it is willing to pay.
Lemma 3 If the utility of a country rises for a change in the e¤ort level, the maximum amount it might
be willing to pay for the change, given that it makes no e¤ort contribution in the e¢ cient allocation, is
eEi(t
E
)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2:
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Remark 2 Note that zi > 0 =) i(tE)  eN
eE
i(tN ) + (e
N )2
eE
  eE > 0, as we have assumed that e¤ort levels
are non-negative.
We will now group the countries according to their willingness to contribute to a fund for transfers that need
to be given to move to the e¢ cient outcome.
Case (I). eE > eN : We will group the countries according to their willingness to contribute for a change in
outcome. In order to do this, we categorize the nations according to their shift in  between the unilateral
outcome and the e¢ cient outcome.
For nation i we have
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ; where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
Since tE < tN for eE > eN (vide Lemma 2), and i(tE) < i(tN ) since t > 0, it follows that zi > 0 i¤
i(tE) > e
N
eE
i(tN )    (note that  = (eN+eE)(eN eE)
eE
is negative, and that e
N
eE
< 1). So, the willingness to
contribute to the fund depend on the change in (:) and the values of eE and eN .
From our results, we observe the crucial importance of how the public support index evolves between the
unilateral and e¢ cient states (rather than a xed level) in determining the contribution to the transfersfund.
In fact, given that e
N
eE
< 1, the public support i(tE) in the institutionally-obtained e¢ cient outcome should
be su¢ ciently close to the support i(tN ) in the unilateral outcome; for a nation to be willing to contribute
a positive amount to the transfersfund, in the case where the e¢ cient level of security is higher than the
unilateral level. This is not surprising, when one realizes that greater security would reduce threat levels,
hence reducing the publics appetite for security (even though, on one hand, greater security related benets
accrue to the nation). Hence a positive contribution towards enhanced security levels can be supported only
if the appetite for security remains high enough, even with a reduction in the threat level. In order to make
our task simpler, we can construct i = i(tE)  eN
eE
i(tN ) and rank countries according to the value of their
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s, such that 1 < 2 < ::: < j < j+1 < ::: < I 1. We note that this ranking of a country in this case
is di¤erent from its ranking according to the value of (:). The value of the s obviously depend on the
change in (:) and the values of eE and eN , and only countries with high enough s would contribute for a
movement to the e¢ cient security level.21
Remark 3 It follows that if there are j nations in the alliance with i = 1; :::; j such that i > , they
would be willing to pay a positive amount for the movement to the e¢ cient outcome.
Case (II). eE < eN :
For nation i let
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ;where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
Since tE > tN for eE < eN , we have i(tN ) < i(tE): Also, in this case  = (e
N+eE)(eN eE)
eE
is positive, and
that e
N
eE
> 1:Now, in order to understand the situations where nations would be willing to pay for a move to
the e¢ cient security level, let us write   eN
eE
i(tN ) = .
Situation 1: For  > 0; zi = i(tE) +  > 0 automatically. In this case, i(tN ) < eN   (eE)2
eN
(solving for
 > 0). This could happen for a low enough i(tN ), or a low enough e
N
eE
(i.e. the e¢ cient and unilateral
e¤ort levels are close), or both.
Situation 2: For  < 0 (which entails a high enough i(tN ); i.e. i(tN ) > eN   (eE)2
eN
), for zi to be positive
we need either a high enough i(tE) (i.e. i(tE) > ), or a low enough e
N
eE
(i.e. the e¢ cient and unilateral
e¤ort levels are close),22 or both.
From the above discussion, it is clear that for zi to be positive, i(tE)  eN
eE
i(tN ) must be positive (as the
term , seen above, is always positive). To make our task simpler, let us construct i = i(tE)  eN
eE
i(tN ),
and rank countries according to the value of their s, such that 1 < 2 < ::: < J < J+1 < ::: < I 1.
Of these, let J nations have i > 0. Loosely speaking, for a large enough di¤erence between the unilateral
and e¢ cient security levels, these would typically be nations whose levels of the public support index in
the e¢ cient regime are su¢ ciently greater than the public support levels in the unilateral regime. In other
words, lesser security (due to the movement to eE) raises the threat, making the public in these nations
su¢ ciently raise their appetite for security. In reality one would expect the public support for security in
21This easily seen. Consider a country having a shift in  from 9 to 1, and another having a higher initial value of ; 11,
which shifts to 10. The ranking of the s for the countries is preserved, but the change for the rst country is higher. However,
in an alternate scenario, if the rst country has a shift from 5 to 1, and the second a shift from 11 to 6, then the change for the
second country is higher.
22This is seen as follows: for eE  ! eN ; eN
eE
 ! 1, reducing zi = i(tE)   i(tN ) + eN   eE which is positive in this
particular case.
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these nations low to begin with, causing them to advocate for a reduction in the security level. The reduced
security would raise threat levels, but would cause a decline in the negative e¤ects of security e¤orts (as seen
earlier), and also enhance the publics appetite for security. So, for the governments of these nations, the
movement to the e¢ cient level would cause an increase in utility levels.
This result is actually quite interesting. One would have thought that less rise in public support in the payer
countries would be desirable, as it would provide the incentive for them to contribute to a cut in e¤ort.
However, the result observed here seems counter-intuitive in that respect. The explanation is that there
is another avenue for the mechanism to work: if the desires of the payers under the e¢ cient regime move
(upward) towards what the desire of nation I is in the unilateral case - then the e¢ cient e¤ort level will be
closer to the unilateral e¤ort level. Thus, the level of transfers needed to support the scheme will be lower,
and hence more likely to be achieved.
Remark 4 It follows that these J nations (with i = I J ; :::; I 1 > 0) may be willing to pay a positive
amount for the movement to the e¢ cient outcome.
However, as we will see in the next section, I will not be able to include all these nations that are potentially
willing to pay for a movement to the e¢ cient outcome among my set of payer nations" in the institutional
scheme designed by me for achieving the e¢ cient level of joint security by the alliance of nations facing the
rogue nations threat.
3.2 Recipients
In this section, I will analyze who will need to be paid for the alliance to move to the e¢ cient level of security.
In what follows, I assume that country I, which had the largest public support index among the countries
in the alliance in the unilateral case still has the largest public support index under the e¢ cient regime. In
other words, the  ranking of country I is preserved, even if the alliance moves from the unilateral to the
e¢ cient security level. The reader will recall that I have the neutral player propose that the alliance shift
to the e¢ cient level with the member nations provisioning the e¤ort prole (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E) - in what
follows, I will term this outcome as the institutional regime": In other words, in both the unilateral, as well
as the e¢ cient scenarios, country I is the only nation undertaking security e¤ort. In what follows, I will
analyze which countries need to be paid (and how much), to realize this proposed e¤ort prole.
For country I, a movement to the e¢ cient level will not entail a loss in utility, if it is given a transfer  ,
seen below. As the unilateral e¤ort level was chosen by country I in the benchmark model, even when the
e¢ cient e¤ort was available, this transfer level should be positive.
 I = V I(mN ; eN ; tN )  V I(mE ; eE ; tE)
= fM I + eN [I(tN )  eN ]  ceNg   fM I + eE [I(tE)  eE ]  ceEg
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= eNI(tN )  eEI(tE)  (eN   eE)[(eN + eE) + c]
Let us now move on to the other nations that are adversely a¤ected by a movement from the unilateral to
the e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort. The main purpose of this exercise is to determine which countries have to be
given a transfer (which I would like to be the minimally required amount, rather than one which would be
Pareto improving for all member nations of the alliance) to maintain the e¤ort prole (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E).
1. Case (I): eE > eN
First, note that the level of e¤ort provision for each country under a scenario where joint e¤ort from other
allies is at the given level eE and threat level is tE , is bei = 12 [i(tE)   2eE   c]. This is the level of e¤ort
that a country would make, if it had to ght the rogue nation with joint e¤ort xed at eE from the side of
all its other allies. Now, for eE > eN ; no country would want to deviate from zero e¤ort. This is easily seen,
as bei < eE (since bei < eN , as tE < tN ): Hence, if no other country other than I was supplying e¤ort in the
unilateral (Nash) outcome,in the e¢ cient outcome no one else would have an incentive to make e¤ort. This
means that for e¤ort eE by I, the best response of other countries would be to make no e¤ort. This means
that to achieve a prole (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E) with eE > eN ; no other country other than I needs to be
compensated by the payer nations (discussed in the last section).
2. Case (II): eE < eN
Now, let ei = 12 [
i(tE)  c] be the private e¤ort level of a nation, i.e. the e¤ort level it would provision if it
had to ght a threat level tE alone, without the help of any allies. For joint e¤ort eE < eN (supplied by I),
countries having private provision ei levels greater than eE would have an incentive to deviate from zero
e¤ort (and make up the di¤erence between eE and ei, gaining utility in the process),23 and hence make it
di¢ cult to sustain the e¤ort prole (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; ::0; e
E). It is easily veried that these are countries for
which i(tE) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I . However, this can be prevented by having a transfer scheme in which
they would be compensated up to their utility level for their private provision level (conditional on making
no e¤ort). This level of transfer is given by  i = V i(mi0; ei   eE ; 0 j ei)  V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE)
= ei[i(tE)  ei]  c(ei   eE)  eE [i(tE)  eE ]
= (ei   eE)[i(tE)  (ei + eE + c)]24
The set of countries for which these transfers are needed contains not only nations which su¤er a loss in utility
due to a movement from the unilateral to the e¢ cient e¤ort level, but may also contain some countries which
gain from the movement. The reason they get compensated is because their private provision level under
23Note that for eI = eE and ej = 0, for j 6= i; I, ei = 1
2
[i(tE)  c  2eE ] = 1
2
[i(tE)  c]  eE = ei   eE , where ei is the
private provision level of i:
24Notice that this compensation amount is one which puts a recipient country at its utility level for the joint e¤ort provision
of the alliance being at its ex post private provision level, but it having to bear the cost of provision only for the amount of this
e¤ort which is above the e¢ cient level. A bit of algebra shows this transfer amount to be positive, substituting for ei, eE ; and
using the fact that i(tE) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I
+
c(I 1)
I
as ei > eE
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the institutional regime" is more than the e¢ cient level. Hence they must to compensated to maintain zero
e¤ort levels, if the e¤ort prole (0; 0; ::0; eE) has to be maintained. Note that set of recipients may include
nations having i > 0, in addition to those with i < 0.
3.3 The subgame perfect equilibrium of the institutional game
In this section I will outline one of the main results of this paper: Proposition 2 below describes the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the institutional game described earlier. This proposition is relevant for the case
eE < eN , and a similar result can easily be derived for the case eE > eN , which I leave to the interested
reader, for the sake of brevity.
In what follows, S is the set of all nations in the alliance, the set P consists of a set of payers among
the nations in the alliance: This set contains nations with i > 0 (see Section 3.1 above) and i(tE) >PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I : The set R consists of all other nations in the alliance (for the sake of simplicity I
make the minor assumption that there are no nations with the same utilities under the unilateral and the
institutional outcome with e¢ cient e¤ort level). I have also assumed that if a country gets the same payo¤
from making zero e¤ort and a positive e¤ort, then it makes no e¤ort. As mentioned earlier, other than these
players, there is a neutral" player in the institutional game" who acts as a proposer and facilitator. I
assume that the ex-post e¢ ciency condition
P
i2P
zi >
P
i2R 
i +  I holds.
Proposition 2 The prole ({Agree, ei = 0 for NP}i2P , {Agree, ei = 0 for NP}i2RnI and i>0;{Agree,
eI = eN for NP}I , {ei = 0 for P & NP}i2RnI and i<0), where P stands for the proposals adoption and NP
for non-adoption, is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the institutional game, for the elements proposal by the
neutral player being such that:
(i). zi for all i 2 P such that 0  zi 6 eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2; and P
i2P
zi =
P
i2R 
i +  I :
(ii). The neutral player proposing to compensate player I an amount  I = eNI(tN )   eEI(tE)   (eN  
eE)[(eN + eE) + c] for eI = eE ; and 0 otherwise.
(iii). Proposing to compensate players i 2 RnI an amount  i = (ei   eE)[i(tE)   (ei + eE + c)], for
choosing ei = 0 in the e¤ort choice subgame with transfers, and 0 otherwise:
(iv). The proposal requiring unanimity support of nation I, nations i 2 P , and nations i 2 RnI and i > 0
who are the only nations invited to vote on the proposal.
This subgame perfect outcome of the institutional game has all invited voters agreeing to pass the neutral
players proposal in the second round and all alliance members i 2 S making e¤ort choices in the third
round such that the e¤ort outcome is (ei)Ii=1 = (0; 0; :::; e
E): Hence, the joint e¤ort of the alliance is at the
institutionally-obtained e¢ cient level.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
This proposition gives an important result, which suggests a particular institutional structure for the alliance
that would help it reach its e¢ cient e¤ort level. For such an institutional structure, unilateral action by a
single nation would be tempered towards the e¢ cient outcome by multilateral participation by other alliance
members. Note that in the above mechanism, nation I is getting cheated" a little bit, compared to the
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other recipients, because they are getting compensated up to the utility of their private e¤ort" levels under
the institutional regime, while nation I is getting compensated only up to the utility of its private e¤ort level
in the unilateral case. However, it can do nothing about it, because if it does not agree to the proposal, the
status quo remains, hence as the unilateral provider in the benchmark case, it can do no better.25
More to the point, Proposition 2 lays out one of the most important contributions of this paper, i.e. how the
evolution of public opinion in the member nations in the alliance might inuence the movement to e¢ ciency.
Endogenizing the threat level allows us to perform this particular analysis. We notice the crucial importance
of how the public support index evolves in the payer states, between the unilateral and e¢ cient states, in
determining the contribution to the transfersfund.
For the case where the e¢ cient level is lower than the unilateral level, for a large enough di¤erence between
the unilateral and e¢ cient security levels, the payer nations would typically need to have levels of the
public support in the institutional (e¢ cient) outcome which are su¢ ciently greater than the levels in the
unilateral case. In other words, lesser security (due to the movement to the e¢ cient security level) raises the
threat, which in turn should su¢ ciently raise the publicsappetite for security. As mentioned before, the
enhancement of the publics appetite for security would cause an increase in utility levels of the governments
of these nations under the institutional regime. In fact, the rise in support causes desires of the payers
under the institutional regime to move up towards the desire of nation I under the unilateral regime. Thus,
the e¢ ciency level will be closer to the unilateral e¤ort level and transfers needed to support the scheme
will be lower. Hence, it will more likely be achieved. Also note that since money and e¤ort are perfectly
substitutable as payments in my model, a real-world scenario might actually involve the payer nations
contributing to boots on the ground", operating under the command and control" of nation I. That
would truly lead to a multilateral, as well as e¢ cient combating of the threat, in every sense.
The relevant results obtained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for the case eE > eN may be easily incorporated into
Proposition 2, to extend it for that case. One main di¤erence would be that only nation I would be needed
to be paid o¤, in that situation. For the payers, we see (somewhat akin to the case eE < eN ) that the level
of public support under the institutional regime should be su¢ ciently close to the public support in that
nation under the unilateral regime, for it to be willing to contribute a positive amount to the transfersfund
(see the applicable results of Section 3.1). This occurs because greater security would reduce threat levels,
hence reducing the publics appetite for security (even though, on one hand, greater security related benets
25This presents us with an interesting question: can a representative government actually reduce the level of security provision,
in face of greater public support (or more strongly put - demand) for action? Note that alongside this support for greater action,
there is now visible multilateral" support for the government Is actions on the world stage, perhaps lower military losses,
and easing of actions which also partly have a negative connotation, in our context. Further, notice that technically the utility
level of the country does not fall from the situation of unilateral action". Thus, given high (in fact, increasing) support for its
war at home, and all the factors mentioned here, the government might not do that badly politically, even if it reduces security
e¤ort. From a certain viewpoint, some security reductions (up to a reasonable point) might in fact suit the government.
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accrue to the nation). Hence a positive contribution towards enhanced security levels can be supported only
if the appetite for security remains high enough, even with a reduction in the threat level.
In sum, the conclusion is that when a movement to a lower" (e¢ cient) level is sought, the public desire for
security in the payer nations (in the institutionally-obtained outcome) should climb up towards the desire
for security in nation I. On the other hand, when a movement to a higher" (e¢ cient) level is sought,
the public desire for security in the payer nations (in the institutional outcome) should not become too
pacist" compared to the desire for security in nation I. Intuitively speaking, in both cases the support
for the movement towards e¢ ciency (through payments) arises from the desires of the payers either getting
close" or remaining close" to the desire of nation I.26
4 Declining public support
In the previous section I have assumed that  is increasing in the level of threat t, hence it > 0. However,
there are some real world occurrences where for some nations the reverse is true, i.e. an increase in the
threat level actually weakens public support for their contributions security e¤orts of the alliance. This may
particularly be true if: (i). these countries are initially low targets for the threats, but then become targets
- making the public feel a that a lower prole in security activities would again make them low priority
targets.27 (ii). The other situation where this would occur is where the public in a target country initially
have a strong appetite for joint security e¤ort, but as the conict progresses, attacks cause them to lose
the appetite for ghting (and more disengagement is advocated, perhaps to deect attacks towards other
countries).28 In order to model this phenomenon, I now assume that for the countries belonging to set P in
the earlier section, it < 0 (so public support begins at a certain level, but as threat levels increase, they go
down). For all other nations it is still positive. It seems natural to investigate what would happen to the
mechanism proposed in Section 3, if the countries that would actually have to pay for a movement from the
unilateral to the e¢ cient outcome remain only fair-weather friends", and in some sense distance themselves
from nation I if the threat situation becomes more dangerous.
1. Case (I): eE > eN
Since tE < tN for eE > eN (vide Lemma 2), for the nations in set P , i(tE)>i(tN ): This means that in
26The reader might note that Proposition 2 gives the individuality rationality constraints of the payees, but does not mention
any specic payment-sharing rule for determining actual transfer payments by individual payees. I would like to add that many
such payment sharing rules are possible, within the limits of the individual rationality constraints. For a survey of possible fair
sharing-rules, see Brams and Taylor (1996).
27The experience in Spain after the Madrid train bombings of 2004, with resultant decline in public support for the war in
Iraq (which was low enough to start with), is a case to the point.
28 Intuitively one might expect the rst situation to occur in an environment where the preferences of the allies were such
that eE < eN , and the second situation to occur in the opposite case.
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this case eE = 12I [
PI
i=1 
i(tE)  c] will be higher than the e¢ cient e¤ort level when all nations had it > 0.
Thus the transfer  I needed to make nation I supply the higher e¢ cient level of e¤ort will be higher:
@ I
@eE
=  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+ 2eE + c
=  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
> 0
(substituting for eE and using the facts that I(tE) < I(tN ) <
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I ;
@I(tE)
@tE
> 0; and
@tE
@eE
< 0)
Recall that there are no other recipients of transfers (except for I) in the case where eE > eN :
Now, for nation i 2 P we have
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ;where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
Since for eE > eN we now have i(tE) > i(tN ); rather than i(tE) < i(tN ) as before, it follows that the
value of zi is higher in this case (or the maximum amount country i is willing to pay for a movement to the
e¢ cient level has gone up compared to the case where public support goes down with a decrease in threat).
So even though a higher transfer amount has to be supported by the payer countries, given that reduction
of the threat actually increases the public support for the conict, it might be easier to support the (higher)
e¢ cient amount of joint e¤ort in this case.
Case (II). eE < eN :
Since tE > tN for eE < eN , for the nations in set P , i(tE) < i(tN ): This means that in this case
eE = 12I [
PI
i=1 
i(tE)   c] will be lower than the e¢ cient e¤ort level when all nations had it > 0. We see
below the transfer  I needed to make nation I supply a lower e¢ cient level of e¤ort might be higher or lower:
@ I
@eE
=  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+ 2eE + c
=  I(tE)  eE @
I(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
+
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
S 0
Thus, from the above equation we have :
@ I
@eE
< 0 if
eE @I(tE)@tE @tE@eE
 <
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
  I(tE)
and
@ I
@eE
> 0 if
eE @I(tE)@tE @tE@eE
 >
PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
  I(tE)
(substituting for eE and using the facts that I(tE) > I(tN ) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I ;
@I(tE)
@tE
> 0; and
@tE
@eE
< 0)
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We see in one of the cases above that a lower transfer might be required to get to the lower e¢ cient e¤ort
level in the case where a combination of factors occur: the increase in threat due to falling e¤ort is not that
high; and there is su¢ cient gain in public support in I (which has an increasing ) due to the increase in
the threat level (thus perversely compensating the government in I for the increase in threat). There is also
saving on costs (as e¤ort provision falls), hence requiring less compensation in form of transfers. In the other,
more intuitive case, a higher transfer is needed to compensate nation I , for it to move to a lower (e¢ cient)
level of e¤ort. As seen below, a similar result does not obtain for other recipients since they are compensated
for their private provision levels under the institutional regime (which increases for a lower e¢ ciency level)
- this is not the case for I; which is compensated up to its private provision level in the unilateral outcome.
Recall that there are other recipients of transfers (other than I) in the case where eE < eN : For these other
recipients of transfers, a reduction in the e¢ cient e¤ort level will also impact the transfer levels. In fact,
the transfer  i needed to make nation i make no e¤ort on its own will be unambiguously higher (for a lower
e¢ cient level of joint e¤ort):
@ i
@eE
= (ei   eE)
"
@i(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
  1
#
  [i(tE)  (ei + eE + c)]
= (ei   eE)
"
@i(tE)
@tE
@tE
@eE
  1
#
  1
2
"
i(tE) 
 PI
i=1 
i(tE)
I
+
c(I   1)
I
!#
< 0
(substituting for ei, eE ; and using the facts that i(tE) >
PI
i=1
i(tE)
I +
c(I 1)
I as e
i > eE ; @
i(tE)
@tE
> 0; and
@tE
@eE
< 0)
Now, for nation i 2 P we have
zi = i(tE)  e
N
eE
i(tN ) + ;where  =
(eN )2
eE
  eE
Since for eE < eN we now have i(tE) < i(tN ); rather than i(tE) > i(tN ); it follows that the value of
zi is lower in this case (or the maximum amount country i is willing to pay for a movement to the e¢ cient
level has gone down compared to the case where public support increase with an increase in threat). The
escalation of the threat decreases the public support for the conict. The above analysis mostly suggests it
might be harder to support the (lower) e¢ cient amount of joint e¤ort in this case, when public opinions in
the allied countries diverge (not in small part also because, under this scenario, the di¤erence between the
unilateral and e¢ cient e¤ort is likely to be much greater). One way to interpret these results is to say that
they give us the conditions under which an alliance will unravel. I compile the above results in Proposition
3 below.
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Proposition 3 If 0(t) < 0 8i 2 P and 0(t) > 0 8i 2 R, then:
(i). For eE > eN , the transfer  I needed to make nation I supply the e¢ cient level of e¤ort and the maximum
transfer zia payer nation is willing to pay, will be higher compared to the case where 0(t) > 0 for all alliance
members.
(ii). For eE < eN , the transfer  I needed to make nation I supply the e¢ cient level of e¤ort may be
either higher or lower (depending on whether
eE @I(tE)@tE @tE@eE  ? PIi=1 i(tE)I + c(I 1)I   I(tE) respectively);
the transfer amount needed to support zero e¤ort levels by other recipient nations will be higher, and the
maximum transfer zia payer nation is willing to pay will be lower, compared to the case where 0(t) > 0 for
all alliance members.
Proposition 3 characterizes the scenario where the public opinion supporting the conict actually drops in a
subset of member nations of the alliance, when the level of threat increases. The results seen in the proposition
have implications for achieving ex post e¢ ciency constraint, hence on workability of the institutional scheme
suggested in this paper:
(i). It turns out that the transfer needed to shift to the e¢ cient level of security, when the e¢ cient level is
higher than the unilateral level, is more than in the earlier scenario (when the public support in all nations
increase for a higher threat). However, as the maximum amount the payer countries are willing to pay for
a movement to the e¢ cient level goes up compared to before (given that reduction of the threat actually
increases the public support for the conict) it might be easier to support the (higher) e¢ cient amount of
joint e¤ort in this case. This case demonstrates that the payers fulll their role as fair-weather friends" in
a situation where the threat becomes less dangerous.
(ii). On the other hand, if the e¢ cient security level is less than the unilateral level, the maximum amount
payer countries are willing to pay for a movement to the e¢ cient level has goes down compared to before,
as the escalation of the threat decreases the public support for the conict. This suggests that it might be
harder to support the (lower) e¢ cient amount of joint e¤ort in this case. While the decrease in decrease
in desire for security e¤ort provides an incentive to pay (by the payers) for reduction in such e¤ort (by the
unilateral provider), there is also a countervailing incentive to not pay in any way for any such e¤ort at all
(when the  value falls too low). When the latter e¤ect dominates, it will be di¢ cult to support the transfer
mechanism, especially if the transfer amount required by the unilateral provider increases at the same time.
(iii). Surprisingly, in the case e¢ cient security level is less than the unilateral level, a scenario is possible
where a lower transfer might be required to get the unilateral provider to the lower e¢ cient e¤ort level. For
that to happen, a combination of factors must occur - the e¢ cient level of security is high enough, the gain
in public support due to the increase in the threat level is su¢ ciently high in the e¤ort-providing nation,
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and the increase in threat level not that high. Thus, the perverse e¤ect of decreasing security, leading to
a greater threat, simultaneously drives up public support in the provider country and saves on cost, hence
requiring less compensation in form of transfers (as this increasing public support increases the utility of
government of the country supplying the security e¤ort to a su¢ cient level, to compensate for the actual
loss in security itself). In this situation, it might possibly be easier to support the transfer mechanism, even
with a decrease in the amount payer countries are willing to pay.
Both cases (ii) and (iii) demonstrate the payers fullling their role as fair-weather friends", who distance
themselves in a situation where the threat becomes more dangerous. Interestingly, the outcome where the
e¢ cient level is higher than the unilateral level seems easier to support through the institutional mechanism
in the presence of fair-weather friends. The opposite is true for the outcome where the e¢ cient level is
lower than the unilateral level, when fair-weather friends" are present.
5 Discussion
There are some broader implications of the results seen in this paper. First, the institutional structure
suggested in Proposition 2 , for the realization of the e¢ cient level of global security, is quite inclusive".
This structure gives all nations in the alliance, except for those that enjoy hugely positive free-riding benets,
a chance to participate in the decision of whether or not to accept the neutral players proposal. Not only
that, since all voting nations have de facto veto rights", all these nations have a strong say in the decision-
making process. From a democratic perspective, this certainly seems desirable. The reader might wonder
whether the unanimity rule is at all needed to secure the e¢ cient outcome, or whether it is an irrelevant
artifact, adding to the complexity of the institutional mechanism? A result by Maggi and Morelli (2006),
when invoked in our context, provides us with an answer. The authors show that unanimity is the best
an organization can do if there is no enforcement of voting outcomes, but if there is enforcement, majority
rule of some kind could be better. In our framework, enforcement of transfer payments occurs through the
handing over of the payment to the neutral player by the payers after the voting process. There is actually
no obvious enforcement mechanism that can force a sovereign nation to pay up against its wishes, if it ends
up on the losing side of a majority vote. In fact, in this kind of situation, the most plausible minimalist
assumption is that a yes" voting nation pays and a no" voting nation does not. Seen in this light, the bite
of the unanimity rule in the institutional mechanism suggested in this paper becomes clear, if the mechanism
has to ensure that all the designated payers pay up their dues.29 If, however, we want to impose the stronger
rule that majority decisions prevail even on the no voters, then for all purposes the rationale of a no" vote
29The reader can easily think of a situation where a designated payer nation having the option of not paying if it votes "no",
would do so, as best response to the yes" votes of a majority of voting nations (who would then be bound to pay up, if the
minimalist assumption of paying according to ones vote, holds). This would create a free-rider problem on the payersend.
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goes away, making the comparison of its desirability vis-a-vis the unanimity rule rather irrelevant.30
A second point of contention arises with regard to the rather strong power of the neutral agent to restrict
voting to a subset of member nations of the alliance.31 However, this restriction should be seen in the proper
context. The restricted countries are ultimate free-riders who actually gain a security level under status quo
beyond a point they would privately (alone) provision, and that too without any contribution towards the
joint e¤ort level. After the movement to the e¢ cient level, they still continue to provide zero e¤ort levels.
However, their security is guaranteed by the proposed mechanism up to their private level. Thus, they have
no incentive to break o¤ from the alliance, even after their voting rights are restricted. What the mechanism
does is curb their role as deal-breakers". In sum, these excluded nations are actually recipients of payments,
and do not make any e¤ort in equilibrium, their exclusion does not seem unfair. Further, as these nations
get compensated so that they gain utility levels which they would have by going-it-alone", we need not fear
an exodus of these nations from the alliance.
Third, given the restrictions of the benchmark model in this paper (linear e¤ort technology, linear costs, no
income e¤ects, and non-binding wealth constraints), would the conclusions of my paper be valid in a more
general context? The relaxation of these constraints will not give us the strong unilateral outcome seen in the
benchmark model, with only one e¤ort provider. However, even though there will be more nations making
e¤ort, the joint e¤ort level will likely not be at the e¢ cient level,32 and given the features of our model,
can be either more or less than e¢ cient for di¤erent parameter values. The question is: will the mechanism
outlined in Proposition 2 work in the more general case, as well? Intuitively, I believe the answer is, yes. To
understand why, note that the main features of the mechanism seen in Proposition 2 are: (i). deal-breakers"
making no e¤ort, but gaining huge utilities under status quo are excluded from voting; (ii). potential payer
nations" are not allowed to free-ride on other payers through the unanimity voting rule; (iii). the e¤ort-
maker is compensated fully up to its status-quo utility level; and (iv) only partial compensation to the some
non-providers who would benet hugely from the status quo. There is no reason why a simple generalization
of this mechanism in the case of multiple e¤ort providers (when the assumptions of the model are relaxed
and strong unilateralism does not occur), where all providers at status quo are compensated fully up to
30On reection, multiple equilibria might be possible in this scenario. One where everyone votes yes" either because each
believes that his vote is decisive or it is irrelevant to vote no" against the majority (and yet pay up). The other would be
where everyone would believe that the majority would vote no and it would be (weakly) irrelevant to vote yes". So, even here
there is some rationale to preserve the unanimity rule, if only to prevent the possibility of the latter bad outcome occurring
sometimes.
31The delegation of powers to a certain select group within a society, to restrict the rights of other members of that society,
is quite common. The prime example of this is the power of the judiciary to control (and restrict) the right of certain portions
of society (through their interpretation of law through the lens of personal preferences) with respect to su¤rage and other
rights (racial, religious, and property rights). Of course, with respect to international law, the relevance of the World Court"
in Hague is questionable, as it precisely has to deal with sovereign nations which can do better" by outing its judgements
(the outside option). However, in the mechanism suggested in this paper, the neutral agents" role does not make any nation
worse o¤" compared to their outcome if they leave the alliance (their outside option). So, there is some hope of success for
the suggested mechanism.
32The literature on alliances makes this abundantly clear. For a survey, see Sandler and Hartley (2001).
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their status-quo utility levels, will not work as well. Further, the payers might have to make compensation
through e¤ort, and not just monetary transfers. Granted, such generalization needs to be done for the sake
of completeness of the literature in the area, and may well provide some further particular insights. So, while
for the sake of simplicity, the current model deals with the phenomenon of strong unilateralism", its central
insights seem fairly general in nature and applicable to more complicated environments. To add some more
specic thoughts on future research direction, I believe that valuable extensions of my model will involve
the consideration of weakest-link" and best-shot" e¤ort technologies. Vicary and Sandler (2002) show
that e¤ort (in-kind) transfers versus income transfers may have di¤erent welfare e¤ects, when weakest-link
e¤ort technologies are considered. This result needs to be deliberated upon, and its implications explored,
when generalizing my model for weakest-link e¤ort technology. Further, Arce and Sandler (2001a) show that
weaker-link and better-shot public goods di¤er in terms of the appropriate institutional design - this insight
has to be considered, and analyzed fully, in the context of the institution suggested in this paper.
Lastly, I believe that the reader might be interested in learning what the mechanism suggested in Proposition
2 might look like, at the practical level. The whole exercise of this paper would come to naught if the idea
of a neutral directorate is not implementable in real life. Fortunately, Gupta (2010) provides a detailed
description of the organizational structure that a neutral directorate should possess, in very pragmatic
terms (see pages 190-192 of that paper). The paper not only suggests how the neutral directorate might
be structured in a real-world situation, but it also discusses some of the problems that it might face in its
operations.33 I believe that the characteristics of the neutral directorate outlined by Gupta (2010) warrants
close consideration - as it contains proposals that are both tangible and implementable. To summarize the
suggestions, they include:
1. A proposal to set up a directorate within the international institution comprising of career o¢ cers belong-
ing to an international civil service" whose membership should be determined by technical qualications
and clearance of a suitable examination process. This directorate would serve as the neutral agent mentioned
in the current paper.
2. An outline of checks and balances (both top-down and bottom-up) among the ranks of these career
o¢ cers which might be required to ensure their neutrality.
3. As the challenges to the neutrality of this directorate would be similar to the di¢ culties faced by Central
33As an aside: the author adopts the view, through examples, that di¢ cult obstacles have been overcome at decisive moments
in human history to adopt important (and perhaps improbable) social mechanisms (which have been e¤ective and remained
functional over time). One example mentioned by the author is that of the United Nations, which has remained operational
and mostly e¤ective in the face of odds, for a very long time. The existence of a supranational entity like the UN cannot be
taken for granted, if one were to observe the breakdown of its immediate predecessor, the League of Nations. In fact, one might
suggest that it took the exact international situation created by two world wars of the twentieth century, to bring about the
successful creation and persistence of the UN.
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Banks with respect to their independence from political interference,34 it might benecial to conduct a
re-evaluation of the latter literature to identify if some of its ndings may be applicable (after suitable
modication) in our present context.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed an institutional structure for e¢ cient provision of global security by an alliance
of nations, against the threat of a rogue nation, which reacts strategically against the alliance. Thus, the
rogue nation and the alliance interact, and the e¤orts of both are endogenously determined. Initially, a
single member of the alliance makes a unilateral security e¤ort, which may not be e¢ cient. However, there
exists an institutional structure that would facilitate the alliances movement from a unilateral to an e¢ cient
level of global security. The e¤ect of evolving public support for security e¤ort in various nations, which
would impact the achievement of such an institutional structure, is studied in this paper. There are notable
implications of how endogenity of the threat level makes the evolution of such public support very important,
in the allied nations multilaterally combating the threat. Further work would involve extending this analysis,
when there is uncertainty regarding the evolution of such public support.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: The solution and uniqueness of the intra-alliance game
By assumption I > i;8i 6= I.
It follows from the solution to the FOC for country i 6= I that for Pj 6=i ej = 12 [I(t)   c]; ei = 0 is its best
response.
But for ei = 0; eI = 12 [
I(t)  c] is the best response for I (from its FOC & the above assumption).
So the (Nash) equilibrium of the intra-alliance game is: (e1; e2; :::; eI) = (0; 0; :::; 12 [
I(t)  c]):
Thus, eN = eI = 12 [
I(t)  c], as ei = 0, for i 6= I:
This equilibrium is unique since for any other prole of e¤ort by the players, at least one player has a
protable deviation:
Consider ei = i  0 for i 6= I , with i > 0 for at least one i:
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Is best response in this case is: eI = 12 [
I(t)  c  2Pj 6=I ej ] > 0 or 0.
But for such a response by I, is best response is: ei = 12 [
i(t)   c   2Pj 6=i;I ej   2eI ] = 12 [i(t)   c  
2
P
j 6=i;I e
j   fI(t)  c  2Pj 6=I ejg]
= 12 [
i(t)  I(t) + 2i]; (putting ei = i > 0)
= i + 12 [
i(t)  I(t)] < i; since i(t) < I(t):
Hence i is not is best response.
Now, consider eI < 12 [
I(t)   c]: We have seen that for ei = 0 for i 6= I , this is not Is best response. The
only way it might be a best response is if ei > 0 for some i 6= I: But we have already seen than any outcome
with ei > 0 for some i 6= I cannot be a Nash equilibrium since ei > 0 is not is best response. Hence the
equilibrium is unique.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If eN ? eE ; then (eN ) 7 (eE) (since e < 0)
Thus, it follows from the solutions for tN and tE that tN 7 tE :
Now, for tN > tE ; let eN > eE :
If eN > eE ; then (eN ) < (eE), since e < 0.
But this violates the original premise that tN > tE (as per the solutions for tN and tE , this would follow
from (eN ) < (eE)).
Thus, it must be true that eN < eE :
So, for tN > tE ;it must be that eN < eE : Similarly, for tN < tE ;it must be that eN > eE :
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. From the individual rationality condition, a country i might be willing to pay a positive amount, i.e.
zi > 0;only when [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]
Or, [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]  0
We note that the utility of i 6= I for the unilateral outcome is M i + eN [i(tN )  eN ];
And its utility in the e¢ cient outcome is M i + eE [i(tE)  eE ]  zi
So, [V i(mE ; eE ; tE) j zi > 0]  [V i(M i; eN ; tN ) j zi = 0]  0
=) fM i + eE [i(tE)  eE ]  zig   fM i + eN [i(tN )  eN ]g  0
=) z i eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2
Thus, the maximum amount i would be willing to pay for the change is eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Part A: The e¤ort choice for i 2 RnI in the third stage of the institutional game is zero
Note that for countries i 2 RnI the best response function in the status quo game is: ei = 12 [i(tN )   c  
2
P
j e
j ]; for i > c+ 2
P
ej ; j 6= i and 0 otherwise.
In the institutional game with transfers, given  i = (ei   eE)[i(tE)   (ei + eE + c)] for ei = 0 and 0
otherwise, the best response e¤ort level is zero, for eE by I and no e¤ort by others.
This is because from the best response function ei = 12 [
i(tE)   c   2Pj ej ]; for i > c + 2P ej ; j 6= i
and 0 otherwise, its best response to eE by I and no e¤ort by others, is to make e¤ort ei   eE : The
payo¤ from making this e¤ort is V i(mi0; ei   eE ; 0 j ei) if eI = eE : But payo¤ from making no e¤ort is
V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE). Since by construction V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE) = V i(mi0; ei   eE ; 0 j ei); i0s e¤ort level zero
is payo¤ equivalent to making e¤ort.35 Note that if a country gets the same payo¤ from making zero e¤ort
and a positive e¤ort, then it makes no e¤ort (by assumption).
Further, for ei =  6= 0;  i = 0 and eI = eE   , for no e¤ort by the other players. Using the best response
functions, it is easy to check that these strategies are indeed best responses to each other.
Hence, is payo¤ from deviation is M i + eE [i(tE)  eE ]  c < M i + eE [i(tE)  eE ] +  i:
Thus, ei = 0 maximizes (weakly) is payo¤, given eI = eE    and ej = 0; j 6= i; I:
35 In this proof V i(mi; ei;  i(ei) j e) denotes is utility from its consumption of the private good mi, the amount of e¤ort ei
that it puts in, and the transfer  i(ei) it gets (dependent on its e¤ort), given the joint e¤ort level e. Note that an e¤ort level
ei is weakly preferred by i to an alternate level ei0, if V i(mi; ei;  i(ei) j e) > V i(mi0ei0;  i0(ei0) j e0) for given e¤ort levels of all
j 6= i:
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Part B: In the second stage of the institutional game, voters unanimously agree" to the neutral players
rst stage proposal
By construction V i(mE ; 0;  i j eE) +  i = V i(mi0; ei   eE ;  i = 0 j ei) for i 2 RnI and i > 0:
By construction V I(mE ; ei = eE ; tE) +  I = V I(mN ; eN ; tN )  V I(mE ; eE ; tE) for I:
As 0  zi 6 eEi(tE)  eNi(tN ) + (eN )2 (eE)2 for all i 2 P; V i(mE ; ei = 0;  i j eE)  V i(M i; ei =
0;  i = 0 j eN ) for these players.
Hence agreeing to the neutral players proposal at least (weakly) dominates not agreeing for all voters. Thus
the proposal is unanimously adopted.
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